In the area of reasoning about actions, one of the key computational problems is the projection problem: to find whether a given logical formula is true after performing a sequence of actions. This problem is undecidable in the general situation calculus; however, it is decidable in some fragments. We consider a fragment P of the situation calculus and Reiter's basic action theories (BAT) such that the projection problem can be reduced to the satisfiability problem in an expressive description logic ALCO(U) that includes nominals (O), the universal role (U), and constructs from the well-known logic ALC. It turns out that our fragment P is more expressive than previously explored description logic based fragments of the situation calculus. We explore some of the logical properties of our theories. In particular, we show that the projection problem can be solved using regression in the case where BATs include a general "static" TBox, i.e., an ontology that has no occurrences of fluents. Thus, we propose seamless integration of traditional ontologies with reasoning about actions. We also show that the projection problem can be solved using progression if all actions have only local effects on the fluents, i.e., in P, if one starts with an incomplete initial theory that can be transformed into an ALCO(U) concept, then its progression resulting from execution of a ground action can still be expressed in the same language. Moreover, we show that for a broad class of incomplete initial theories progression can be computed efficiently.
Introduction
The projection problem is an important reasoning task in AI. It is a prerequisite to solving other computational problems including planning and high-level program execution. Informally, the projection problem consists in finding whether a given logical formula is true in a state that results from a sequence of transitions, when knowledge about an initial state is incomplete. In description logics (DLs) and earlier terminological systems, this problem was formulated using roles to represent transitions and concept expressions to represent states. This line of research as well as earlier applications of DLs to planning and plan recognition are discussed and reviewed in [9] . Using a somewhat related approach, the projection problem and a solution to the related frame problem (i.e., how to provide a concise axiomatization of non-effects of actions) have been explored using propositional dynamic logic, e.g., see [8, 7] These papers discuss relations with the propositional fragment of the situation calculus and review previous work. A more recent work explores decidable combinations of several modal logics, or combining description logics with a modal logic of time or with a propositional dynamic logic [1, 30, 5] The resulting logics are somewhat limited in terms of expressivity because to guarantee the decidability of the satisfiability problem in the combined logic, only atomic actions can be allowed. In applications, it is sometimes convenient to consider actions with arbitrary many arguments.
On the other hand, there are several proposals regarding the integration of DLs and reasoning about actions [19, 3, 17, 4, 11] . In [11] , it is shown that the projection problem is decidable in a proposed fragment of the situation calculus (SC). However, the logical languages developed in these papers are not expressive enough to represent some of the action theories popular in AI or to solve the projection problem in a general case. For example, Gu& Soutchanski propose a DL based situation calculus [11] , where the projection problem is reduced to the satisfiability problem in ALCO(U), a DL that adds nominals O and the universal (global) role U to the well known description logic ALC. The universal role links any two individuals in the domain; it is introduced to add the usual unguarded ∀-and ∃-quantifiers which are handy to represent incomplete knowledge about an initial state and about conditional effects. They consider Reiter's basic action theories (BATs) [28] , but impose syntactic constraints on the formulas that can appear in axioms by concentrating on a subset FO DL of FO 2 formulas, where FO 2 is a fragment of first order logic (FOL) with only two variables. In the fragment of SC that they consider, action functions may have at most two object arguments, the formulas in the precondition axioms (PA) and context formulas in the successor state axioms (SSA) should be FO DL formulas (if the situation argument is suppressed), where FO DL formulas are those FO 2 formulas, which can be translated into a concept in ALCO(U) using the standard translation between DLs and fragments of FOL. They illustrate their proposal with several realistic examples of dynamic domains, but it turns out that some of the wellknown examples, e.g., the Logistics domain from the first International Planning Competition (IPC) [26] , cannot be represented due to syntactic restrictions on the language they consider. Here and subsequently, when we mention planning domain specifications, we consider them as FOL theories without making the Domain Closure Assumption (DCA) common in planning, i.e., without reducing them to purely propositional level. Later, [10] introduces a possible extension, where the syntactic restrictions on the class of formulas FO DL are relaxed, but stipulates SSAs for dynamic roles (fluents with two object arguments and one situational argument) to be context-free. She conjectures, but does not prove, that the projection problem in that extension can be reduced to satisfiability in ALCO(U).
In our paper, we consider an even more expressive fragment of SC, called P, where all SSAs can be context dependent with context conditions formulated in a language L that includes FO DL as a proper fragment. Manual translations of planning specifications (from IPC) into our language P show that P has expressive power sufficient to represent not only Blocks World and Logistics, but also many other popular benchmarks [12, 31] . In any case, reducing projection to satisfiability in ALCO(U) is justified by the fact that there are several off-the-shelf OWL2 reasoners that can be employed to solve the latter problem, since a DL SROIQ underlying the Web Ontology Language (OWL2) includes ALCO(U) as a fragment [6] . We concentrate on foundational work and explore the logical properties of P.
Our paper contributes to reasoning about actions by formulating an expressive fragment of SC where the projection problem is decidable without the domain closure assumption (DCA) and closed world assumption (CWA), i.e., when an initial theory is incomplete and is not purely propositional.
Definition of P
The situation calculus (SC) is a many-sorted language with disjoint sorts object, action, situation, where the situation terms are built using the constant S 0 , the initial situation, and the function do(a, s) that denotes the new situation that results from executing an action a in situation s. (Lower case a represents variable of sort action, s represents variable of sort situation, while upper case A, possible with arguments, stands for an action function.) We assume that the reader is familiar with SC from [27, 28] and
use the binary predicate symbol Poss, one axiom for each action function, characterizing when action is possible, successor state axioms (SSAs) D SS , one axiom for each fluent, that define a value of the fluent in the next situation do(a, s) given values of fluents in current situation s, depending on whether a was action that makes the fluent true, or if the fluent was already true in s, whether a is an action that makes the fluent false, a set of unique name axioms UNA, an initial theory D S 0 that specifies an incomplete theory of the initial situation S 0 , and Σ -a set of domain independent foundational axioms about the relation s 1 s 2 of precedence between situations s 1 and s 2 . In [28] , axioms Σ are formulated in second-order logic, all other axioms are in many-sorted FOL, so we assume the usual definitions of sorts, terms, well-formed formulas, and so on. A fluent is a predicate with the last argument s of sort situation. As usual, we say that a situation calculus FOL formula ψ(s) is uniform in s, if s is the only situation term mentioned in ψ(s), the formula ψ has no occurrences of the predicates Poss, ≺, and has no quantifiers over variables of sort situation. The formula ψ obtained by deleting all arguments s from fluents in the formula ψ(s) uniform in s is called the formula with suppressed situation argument (this is convenient when defining syntactic constraints on ψ); the interested readers can find details in [27] .
Fluents with a single object argument, F(x, s), are called dynamic concepts, and fluents with two object arguments, F(x, y, s), are called dynamic roles. In the signature of a BAT D, any predicate that is not a fluent must have either one or two arguments, and is called either a (static) concept, or a (static) role, respectively. Subsequently, we consider only BATs with relational fluents, and do not allow any other function symbols except do(a, s) and action functions. In particular, terms of sort object can be only constants or variables. Actions may have any number of object arguments.
To specify syntactic constraints on D ap and D ssa , we consider a language L , that has at most n + 2 object variables x, y, z 1 , . . . , z n , for some integer n > 0. We assume L has at least n constants b i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The purpose of the variables z i is to serve as place-holders to be instantiated with constants b i that occur as named object arguments of ground action terms. This language L consists of two related sets of formulas: F x and F y . Formulas φ (x) from the set F x can have as free variables either x, or some of the place-holder variables z i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, but cannot have free occurrences of y. Formulas φ (y) from the set F y can have free occurrences of either y, or some of the place holders z i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, but cannot have free occurrences of x. Note the formulas φ may have free variables z i that are not shown explicitly, but it will be always clear from the context which variables are free in the formulas. We use the symbol · to denote a bijection between F x and F y . If φ (x) ∈ F x , then φ (y) is the dual formula of φ (x), obtained by renaming in φ (x) every occurrence of x (both free and bound) with y and every bound occurrence of y with x. Similarly, if φ (y) ∈ F y , then φ (x) is the dual formula to φ (y) obtained by replacing every occurrence of y with variable x, and every bound occurrence of x with y. The sets F x and F y have a non-empty intersection. For example, sentences that mention constants only, and F x formulas that have only occurrences of z variables belong to both F x and to F y . Each formula φ without x, y variables is mapped by bijection φ to itself. We are ready to give the following inductive definition. Definition 1. Let L be the set of first-order logic formulas such that L = F x ∪ F y , and · be a bijection between formulas in F x and F y as defined above, where the sets F y and F x are minimal sets constructed as follows. (We focus on F x , since F y is similar.)
1. and ⊥ are in F x .
2. If AC is a unary predicate symbol, z is a variable distinct from x and y, and b is a constant, then the formulas AC(x), AC(z), and AC(b) are in F x .
3. If b is a constant, and z is a variable that is distinct from x and y, then the formulas
4. If R is a binary predicate symbol, b 1 and b 2 are constants, and z 1 and z 2 are variables that are distinct from x and y, then R(
7. If φ (x) ∈ F x , R is a binary predicate symbol, b is any constant, z is any variable distinct from x and y, and φ (y) is the formula dual to φ (x), then all of the following formulas with quantifiers guarded by R belong to F x : ∃y.R(x, y) ∧ φ (y), ∃y.R(b, y) ∧ φ (y), ∃y.R(z, y) ∧ φ (y), as well as . We say a formula φ ∈ L is a z-free L formula, if all occurrences of variables z (if any), other than x and y, in φ are instantiated with constants. Lemma 1. There are syntactic translations between the set of z-free formulas φ ∈ L and the concept expressions from the language ALCO(U) in both directions, i.e., they are equally expressive. Moreover, such translations lead to no more than a linear increase in the size of the formula.
This lemma is proved using the standard translation between DLs and FOL; the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 in [11] . Using the fluents Loaded(box, s), At(box, city, s), and In(box, vehicle, s) from Logistics as an example, after suppressing
are nominals (i.e., concepts interpreted as singleton sets). The formula ∀x(¬Box(x) ∨ x = B 1 ∨ At(x, Toronto)), all boxes distinct from B 1 are in Toronto, is translated as ∀U.(¬Box {B 1 } ∃At.{Toronto}). Notice why nominals and U are important. Subsequently, we consider BATs that use L -like formulas uniform in s. This motivates the following requirements. For brevity, let a vector x of object variables denote either x, or y, or x, y ; also, letz denote a vector of place holder variables. Action precondition axioms D AP : For each action function A( z), there is a single precondition axiom uniform in s:
where Π A ( z, s) is uniform in s; it is an L formula with z as the only free variables, if any, when s is suppressed. When object arguments of A( z) are instantiated with constants, by Lemma 1, the RHS of each precondition axiom can be translated into a concept in ALCO(U), when s is suppressed. Successor state axioms D SS : There is a single SSA for each fluent F( x, do(a, s)). In comparison to the general SSAs provided in [27, 28] , we impose syntactic restrictions on formulas that can be used on the RHS in the SSAs. We assume that each axiom is as follows:
where each of the γ F 's are disjunctions either of the form
/* a set of variables z ⊆ u; may be {x} ∈ u */ if (2) is a SSA for a dynamic concept F(x, s) with a single object argument x, or (2) is a SSA for a dynamic role F(x, y, s), where φ ( x, z, s) is a context condition uniform in s saying when an action A can have an effect on the fluent F. The formula φ (x, z, s) ∈ F x , the formula φ (y, z, s) ∈ F y , when s is suppressed. A set of variables z in a context condition φ ( x, z, s) must be a subset of object variables u. If u in an action function A( u) does not include any z variables, then there is no ∃ z quantifier.
If not all variables from x are included in u, then it is said that A( u) has a global effect, since the fluent F experiences changes beyond the objects explicitly named in A( u) (e.g., driving a truck between two locations changes location of all boxes loaded into the truck). When a vector of object variables u contains both x and z, we say that the action A( u) has a local effect. A BAT is called a local-effect BAT if all of its actions have only local effects. Observe that in a local-effect SSA, when one substitutes a ground action term
Initial Theory D S 0 : The D S 0 is an L sentence without z variables, i.e., it can be transformed into an ALCO(U) concept.
A BAT D that satisfies all of the above requirements is called an action theory P. We note that BATs proposed in [11] are less general than P, because their axioms should be written using formulas from FO DL , but FO DL is a proper subset of L . Sometimes, for clarity, when we talk about P, we say that it is an L -based BAT, in contrast to FO DL -based BATs considered in [11] . The Blocks World is an example of a FO DL -based BAT, while Logistics is an example of P. Logistics cannot be formulated as a FO DL -based BAT because it includes actions, e.g., drive(Truck, Loc 1 , Loc 2 ,City), with more than 2 arguments, and the SSA for a dynamic role At(ob j, loc, s) uses as a context condition an F x formula, while in [11] , the SSAs for dynamic roles must be context-free. Subsequently, for brevity, instead of saying that φ (s) is a SC formula uniform in s that becomes an L formula when s is suppressed, we say simply that φ (s) is an L formula.
Due to space limitations, we skip introduction to DLs, but the reader can find one in [2] . Recall that the satisfiability problem (SAT) of a concept and/or the consistency problem of an ABox in the DL language ALCO(U) can be solved in EXPTIME. As a comparison, SAT in SROIQ (this DL includes ALCO(U) as a fragment) has high complexity 2NEXPTIME-complete. However, W3C recommends OWL2 for applications, because OWL2 solvers handle many large realistic instances reasonably fast, see [6] for a related discussion of OWL2 and SROIQ. Example 1. As an example of P, imagine searching for a given file in a depth-first search (DFS) like manner through directories. An action f orward(z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) makes forward transition from a current directory z 1 to its child directory z 2 while searching for a file z 3 . It is possible in situation s, if z 2 has never been visited. This is represented using the fluent vis(z 2 , z 3 , s). A backtrack(z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) transition from z 1 back to its parent z 2 is possible only if all children of z 1 had been visited while searching for a file z 3 . P also includes situation independent unary predicates f ile(x), dir(x), and the binary predicate dirChild(x, y) meaning that x is a direct child of y in a file system. The search for a file f in a directory d succeeds when f ind(d, f ) is executed. This action is possible when d actually contains f . This is represented using the fluent at(d, f , s). Using chmod(z 1 , z 2 ) one can toggle in situation s permissions of a directory z 1 between z 2 = on and z 2 = o f f , if the current permission x for this directory z 1 , represented using the fluent perm(z 1 , x, s), is such that the values of x and z 2 are opposite. The following are precondition axioms (PA) for all actions (the variables z i , s are ∀-quantified at front).
The direct effects and non-effects of actions are formulated using Successor State Axioms (SSA). The current DFS for a file y arrives at a directory x when either forward or backtracking transition leads to x; otherwise, if any other action is executed, it remains at x. Also, the directory x becomes visited as soon as DFS arrives there following some forward transition, but only if the current permission of x is on in situation s. Otherwise, forward transition has no effect. Changing permission of a directory x to y has an effect only when DFS for a file is currently located at x in situation s. A file f is found after doing f ind(x, z 1 in a directory z 1 only if permission is on for this directory in s.
These SSAs satisfy syntactic constraints in P, but they cannot be formulated as FO DL -based SSAs considered in [11] since SSAs for the dynamic roles at and perm have context conditions and mention action terms with more than 2 arguments. Observe that our SSAs use two object variables, in addition to action and situation variables. Also, they use the situation term do(a, s) and several action terms. Clearly, neither PAs, nor SSAs can be translated to a DL. Nevertheless, there are instances of the projection problem in this BAT that can be reduced to SAT in a DL. This reduction is discussed in the following section. Observe that we are not interested in checking satisfiability of arbitrary formulas from P, we are interested instead only in solving the projection problem in P.
3 The Projection Problem in P Let D be a description logic based BAT defined in [11] , α 1 , · · · , α n be a sequence of ground action terms, and Goal(s) be a query formula uniform in s such that it can be transformed into an ALCO(U) concept, if s is suppressed. Subsequently, we call a query Goal(S) a regressable formula, if S is a ground situation term. One of the most important reasoning tasks in the SC is the projection problem, that is, to determine whether D |= Goal(do([α 1 , · · · , α n ], S 0 )). Another basic reasoning task is the executability problem: whether all ground actions in α 1 , · · · , α n can be consecutively executed. This can be reduced to the projection problem using the precondition axioms, and for this reason we no longer consider it. Planning and high-level program execution are two important settings where the executability and projection problems arise naturally. Regression is a central computational mechanism that forms the basis of automated solutions to the executability and projection tasks in the SC [28] . A recursive definition of the modified regression operator R on any regressable formula Goal(S) is given in [11] . The modified regression operator makes sure that the only two available object variables x, y are re-used when regressing a quantified formula in contrast to Reiter's regression, where new variables are introduced. For a regressable formula Goal(S), we use notation R[Goal(S)] to denote the regressed formula uniform in S 0 that results from replacing repeatedly fluent atoms about do(α, s) by logically equivalent expressions about s as given by the RHS of SSAs, until such replacements no longer can be made; this is why the regressed formula is uniform in S 0 . For any static concept C(x) and role R(x, y), by definition of regression R[C(x)] =C(x) and R[R(x, y)] = R(x, y).
The regression theorem (Theorem 8) proved in [11] shows that R[Goal(S)] is a FO DL formula, when S 0 is suppressed and, as a consequence, one can reduce the projection problem for a regressable sentence Goal(S) to the satisfiability problem in ALCO(U) as long as a BAT D satisfies syntactic restrictions due to using FO DL formulas in axioms:
, where it is assumed that D S 0 includes UNA, unique name axioms for objects. (Unique name axioms for actions are used by modified regression, and they are no longer required when regression terminates.) This statement is proved in [11] for an extended BAT that additionally includes a set of axioms
Here, the static TBox D T,st is an acyclic set of concept definitions, G(x) ≡ φ G (x), that mentions only situation independent predicates, where G is an unary predicate symbol and φ G (x) is a FO DL formula that has no occurrences of fluents. In [11] , D S 0 includes D T,st . The dynamic TBox D T,dyn is an acyclic set of abbreviations, G(x, s) ≡ φ G (x, s), where φ G (x, s) is a FO DL formula (when s is suppressed) such that φ G (x, s) has occurrences of fluents, and φ G (x, s) may acyclically mention other abbreviations; φ G (x, s) is a formula uniform in s. The abbreviations G(x, s) are different from fleunts because they do not have SSAs. They can be mentioned only in the RHS of SSAs, and they are eliminated by the modified regression operator using lazy unfolding. For example, D T,st may include situation independent static definitions such as "vehicle is a truck or an airplane", while D T,dyn may include convenient situation dependent abbreviations like Movable(x, s) ≡ Loaded(x, s) ∧ ∃yIn(x, y, s). See [11] for more examples. The previously mentioned acyclicity assumption originates in [3] .
We would like to eliminate a previous assumption that D T,st is acyclic. For simplicity, let us consider a case when D T,dyn = / 0. Let D be P such that its initial theory D S 0 is augmented with an arbitrary satisfiable static TBox D T,st that may include general concept inclusions between ALCO(U) concepts. (This TBox can be expressed as an ALCO(U) concept.) Then, by the relative satisfiability theorem from [27] , Σ∪D ap ∪D ssa ∪UNA∪D S 0 ∪D T,st is satisfiable iff UNA∪D S 0 ∪D T,st is satisfiable, i.e., the presence of a static satisfiable ontology is harmless. Moreover, since regression does not affect the predicates without a situation term, in other words, since axioms in D T,st are invariant wrt the regression operator, it can be used to answer "static" queries and to reduce the projection problem to the satisfiability in
when Goal is an L sentence without z-variables that has no occurrences of fluents (a "static" query), and UNA includes unique name axioms only for objects. This simple observation is a consequence of Lemma 1 and the regression theorem from [27] . In addition, in P we can prove that formulas from L remain to be in L after regression. This can be proved similarly to Lemma 2 from Section 5.4 in [11] that is proved for a FO DL -based BAT. However, this does not follow directly from [11, 10] because in P, SSA for dynamic roles may have context conditions, but in [11, 10] it was assumed that SSA for dynamic roles are context free. Also, recall that FO DL is a proper subset of L . The proof is long and laborious because regression is a syntactic operation, and the SSAs in P may have several different syntactic forms, but we have to analyze all cases and show that if we start with a DL-like formula, then after a single step of regression we get a formula that remains DL-like. As a consequence, for the "dynamic" queries, we have the following.
be P augmented with a (static) general ALCO(U) TBox , φ (S) be a regressable z-free L sentence, and S be a ground situation. Then the projection problem can be reduced to satisfiability in ALCO(U):
This follows from Theorem 1 by induction on the length of the situation term S, from Lemma 1, and from the fact that UNA ∪ D S 0 ∪ D T,st can be transformed into an ALCO(U) concept. The Theorem 2 is important because it shows that any static ALCO(U) ontology can be seamlessly integrated with reasoning about actions in P. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to propose this. Our contribution is important because one may expect that in applications a static TBox characterizing essential terminological connections between concepts does not change when actions are executed, but only fluents can change. Also, one can add an acyclic dynamic TBox D T,dyn to P without any difficulties, as in [11] . However, [3, 17, 4] and others argue that a general dynamic TBox leads to serious difficulties. While [3] does not consider a general static TBox D T,st , it could be added, e.g., by internalizing D T,st into an ALCO(U) concept and including it as an ABox assertion wrt a dummy individual. This trick was not considered in [3] , because the universal role U is required for this trick, but U was missing in [3] .
Example 1 (Cont.) We would like to adapt for our purposes an example of a general TBox from the paper by Giuseppe De Giacomo, Maurizio Lenzerini "TBox and ABox Reasoning in Expressive Description Logics", KR 1996, pages 316-327). Suppose that a TBox has the following concept inclusions:
Let D S 0 be the following incomplete theory (in FOL syntax; can be easily translated to ALCO(U)):
The UNA for object constants: f 1, f 2, home, mes, o f f , on, root, wyehia are pairwise distinct. Let the projection query be whether D ∪ TBox |= f ound( f 1, S), where S is do([backtrack(wyehia, home, f1), f orward(home, mes, f1), f ind( f1, mes)], S0)). Then, it is easy to see that the regressed query is ( ( f 1 = f 1 ∧ perm(mes, on, S0)) ∨ f ound( f 1, S0) ) This example demonstrates that we managed to solve the projection problem in the presence of a general expressive static TBox. As far as we know, we are the first to propose the approach to integrating DLs and reasoning about actions that can accomplish this. This example BAT has been implemented in XML, regression of a query was computed using a C++ program, SAT in SROIQ was solved using HERMIT; see details at http://www.scs.ryerson.ca/mes/dl2012.zip
Progression in Local-effect BATs
This section reviews previously published definitions and results: the readers familiar with forgetting and progression can skip it. Since progression is closely related to forgetting, we start with reviewing the definitions and some of the recent results about forgetting. The concept of forgetting was introduced in [15] and was also studied in [18] . One can forget about a ground atom or about a predicate in general; we consider the former case. A theory T is the result of forgetting about a ground atom P( c) in a theory T , if T entails all sentences entailed by T except the ones "related" to P( c).
Definition 2. Let P( c) be a ground atom, and let M 1 and M 2 be two first-order structures. We write M 1 ∼P( c) M 2 if M 1 and M 2 agree on everything except possibly on the interpretation of P( c):
1. M 1 and M 2 have the same domain, and interpret every function identically.
For every predicate
Q distinct from P, M 1 [Q] = M 2 [Q].
Let u = M 1 [ c], then for any tuple d of the elements in the domain that is distinct from u, d
Definition 3. Let T be a theory, and p a ground atom. A theory T is a result of forgetting about p in T , denoted by f orget(T, p), if for any structure M , M is a model of T iff there is a model M of T such that M ∼p M .
The result of forgetting a ground atom P( c) in φ can be computed by simple syntactic manipulations. Let φ [P( c)] denote the formula obtained from φ by replacing every occurrence of P(x) (if any) in φ by:
Theorem 3. ([15]
, Theorem 4) Let T = {φ } be a theory, and P( c) be a ground atom, then f orget(T, P( c)) = φ + ∨ φ − , where φ + and φ − are the result of replacing P( c) by and ⊥ in φ [P( c)], respectively.
For the purpose of computing progression, when forgetting is applied multiple times, and, possibly to the same predicate symbol more than once, it's possible to define the notion of forgetting about a set of ground atoms at once, as suggested in [18] . Let Γ be a finite set of ground atoms to be forgotten. We call a truth assignment θ to atoms from Γ a Γ-model. We use M (Γ) to denote the set of all Γ-models. Let φ be a formula and θ a Γ-model. Let P( c 1 ), P( c 2 ), ... P( c m ) be all those ground atoms in Γ, which use the predicate letter P, and let θ (P( c j )) represent the truth value of P( c j ) specified by θ . We use φ [θ ] to denote the result of replacing (for each predicate symbol P in Γ) every occurrence of an atom P( x) in φ by the following formula: As observed in [15] , forgetting about a set Γ of ground literals amounts to forgetting about each literal one after another, i.e., if
Lin and Reiter formalized the notion of progression in [16] . Informally, it involves updating an initial theory D S 0 with the effects of executing an action α. The idea behind progression is that we want the BAT D to "forget" about all the logical consequences of the fluents in D S 0 that change, as a result of executing action α. We denote as S α the situation term do(α, S 0 ). Definition 4. For two many-sorted structures M , M of the situation calculus signature, and a ground action α, we write M ∼ S α M if: (1) M and M have the same domains for sorts action and object; (2) M and M interpret all situation-independent predicate and function symbols identically; (3) M and M agree on interpretation of all fluents at S α , i.e. for every fluent F and every variable assignment σ , we have M , σ |= F( x, S α ) iff M , σ |= F( x, S α ). In STRIPS, progression D S α is merely an insertion and removal of literals based on the effects of α. In more complex languages, such as the situation calculus, progression is always definable as a second order theory. We are interested in a middle point between these two extremes: a local-effect BAT based on a convenient language X that is preserved by forgetting; [18] prove in their Theorem 3.6 that X=FOL. We argue that in P X can be instantiated with our language L .
Subsequently in this section, we consider only local-effect BATs. For local effect BATs, the change that occurs due to executing the action α affects a finite set of ground fluents, so progression involves merely forgetting about those ground literals in the initial theory and computing their new values from SSAs. The set of these literals is called the characteristic set of α and is denoted by Ω(s), where Ω(S 0 ) is the set to be forgotten and Ω(S α ) is the new set of values. These sets can be computed as follows. First, instantiate a in D SS with a ground action α i ( t i , t z i ), apply UNA for actions, and ∃z(z = b ∧ φ ( x i , z, s)) ≡ φ ( x i , b, s) repeatedly. This eliminates ∃z from RHS of each axiom (2) in D SS , and each context condition becomes a z-free formula. As a result of this transformation, each disjunction in γ F in (2) becomes either x = t (2) . Second, define the argument set ∆ F j for each fluent F j :
The characteristic set of α is the following set:
where the set Ω(s) includes F j ( t i , s) for each t i ∈ ∆ F j . Observe that in P, since P is an L -based BAT, both φ 
where F( t, S α ) ∈ Ω(S α ) and Φ F is the instantiated right hand-side of the SSA for fluent F w.r.t. a ground action α. Note that for progression to be definable, the language X should be able to express the conjunction of D 
where ψ(u/v) is the result of replacing all occurrences of v in ψ by u. Moreover, using notation from Theorem 4, we have:
From (7), it follows that size of D S α can increase in comparison to the size of D S 0 . For this reason, [18] considers a special case of a proper + D S 0 . The proper + KBs are proposed in [13] as a generalization of proper KBs [14] . In [18] , the authors showed for a local-effect BAT that progression of an initial theory in proper + form can be computed efficiently. For this purpose, they defined a normal form such that once a KB has been transformed into this normal form, forgetting becomes straightforward. Below, we reproduce a sequence of definitions and propositions from their paper, but we also introduce new terminology. Let e be an ewff, a well-formed formula whose only predicate is equality, and let a clause d be a disjunction of literals. Then, the universal closure ∀(e ⊃ d) is called a guarded clause, or a proper + -formula. A KB is called proper + if it is a finite non-empty set of guarded clauses supplemented with the axioms of equality and the set of UNA for constants.
The notion of forgetting about a ground atom P( c) brings in the related notion of irrelevance, which divides formulas into those which are affected, and those formulas which are not affected by forgetting about P( c). Definition 6. Let P( c) be a ground atom, φ be a sentence. Then, P( c) is irrelevant to φ iff f orget(φ , P( c)) ≡ φ .
Note that when φ has no occurrences of P( c), then P( c) is irrelevant to φ . Using the distributivity law ((a ∨ p) ∧ (b ∨ p)) ≡ (a ∧ b ∨ p) one can collect sub-formulas from all clauses in a KB with positive occurrences of p into a single conjunction φ pos . Similarly, using the distributivity law ((a ∨ ¬p) ∧ (b ∨ ¬p)) ≡ (a ∧ b ∨ ¬p) one can combine sub-formulas occurring together with ¬p in clauses of a KB into the conjunction φ neg . Then, from Theorem 3 about forgetting (see above) one can easily obtain this: Proposition 1. ([18] , Prop. 5.3) Let P( c) be a ground atom, φ pos , φ neg , and φ irr be sentences to which P( c) is irrelevant, and KB be (
This proposition is important because it shows a class of formulas where forgetting about P( c) can be easily computed. However, note that the KB resulting from forgetting is not in a proper + form; it needs some reshaping using logically equivalent transformations.
Since proper + KB are not purely propositional, a simple condition is required to find when a ground atom P( c) is irrelevant. The following proposition serves this purpose. Proposition 2. ([18] , Prop. 5.4) Let P( c) be a ground atom, and φ = ∀(e ⊃ d) be a guarded clause. If for every P( t) in d we have that e ∧ t = c is unsatisfiable, then P( c) is irrelevant to φ .
The previous proposition provides an easily verifiable condition that is sufficient to determine whether P( c) is irrelevant to φ . The following normal form (NF) introduced in [18] and the next proposition prepare the ground for forgetting efficiently in proper + KBs.
Definition 7.
( [18] , Def. 5.5) Let P( c) be a ground atom, and φ = ∀(e ⊃ d) be a guarded clause. Then, φ is in normal form (NF) w.r.t. P( c) if for any P( t) appearing in d, either t is c or e ∧ t = c is unsatisfiable. A proper + KB is in normal form w.r.t. P( c), if its every guarded clause is in normal form w.r.t. P( c).
Proposition 3. ([18] , Prop. 5.6) Let P( c) be a ground atom. Every proper + KB can be transformed into a logically equivalent one which is in normal form NF w.r.t. P( c). This transformation takes O(n + m·2 k ) time, where n is the size of the KB, m < n is the size of sentences, where P appears, and k is the maximum number of occurrences of P( x) in a sentence of the KB. [18] show that after converting a proper + KB into their normal form NF w.r.t. P( c), it is easy to forget P( c), and then transform the resulting formula back into proper + KB. They also show that if the RHS of all SSA are essentially quantifier free (i.e., if context conditions can be simplified to quantifier free formulas), then D SS [Ω(S)] is definable as a proper + KB. As a consequence of all these results, progression of a proper + KB can be computed in linear time w.r.t. n, the size of the KB. Unfortunately, we cannot apply these results directly because it remains unclear whether the transformations required to maintain proper + form after forgetting introduce new variables or not. Since, we can only use two variables, this issue is crucially important.
Progression in P
In this section, we use the notion of forgetting about a sequence of ground atoms, the notion of progression in SC, the fact about definability of progression in FOL for local effect BATs, and notation introduced in [15, 16, 18] . Recall that P is any L -based BAT. It is easy to give an example of P with global effect actions such that progression of D S 0 is not definable as a z-free L sentence. Subsequently, we consider only local-effect P action theories, and we talk about z-free L sentences that can be transformed into an ALCO(U) concept. Below, we prove that progression of a z-free L sentence D S 0 is still expressible as a z-free L sentence D S α (here and subsequently, for brevity, we talk about situation-suppressed sentences). This does not follow from Theorem 3.6 in [18] about definability of progression in FOL for local-effect BATs, since our initial theory D S 0 is formulated in a strict subset of FO 2 language, and it is not obvious at all whether in P progression D S α of D S 0 can still be defined within same language. Since progression involves forgetting about old values of fluents and computing new values, we need a couple of intermediate lemmas. First, we show that new fluent values can be expressed in L . Then, we prove that the result of forgetting about ground fluents in D S 0 affected by a ground action α remains to be a z-free L sentence. , it is a set of bi-conditionals, but each of them is simply syntactic sugar for:
It is clear that if both F and Φ F are L formulas, then so is the formula above. Moreover,
• F( t, S α ) is a ground fluent, so it is a L formula when the term S α is suppressed.
• Φ F ( t, α, S 0 ) is of this form (after suppressing S 0 ):
where each of φ + i and φ − i is an L -formula without free variables. This is because replacing an action variable in a local effect SSA (2) with a ground action, using UNA for actions, and applying ∃z(z = b∧φ (z)) ≡ φ (b) repeatedly yields z-free L -formulas φ + i and φ − i . Indeed, recall that each context condition φ i is a formula with syntax F x ∧ F y , but eliminating ∃z and instantiating φ i with t yields an L formula. Hence, Φ F ( t, α, S 0 ) is an L formula without any free variables.
One thing to note is that F( t, S α ) and Φ F ( t, α, S 0 ) are not uniform in the situation term. However, F( t, S α ) can never occur in Φ F or any RHS of SSA of other fluents because they are all uniform in S 0 . Also, none of the ground fluents in Ω(S 0 ) to be subsequently forgotten are relevant to F( t, S α ) simply because it is the value of the fluent F at a different ground situation term S α , which makes it a totally different predicate from the point of view of forgetting. This can be easily verified using the syntactuc rule provided in Theorem 3 for computing forgetting. For these reasons, we can replace F( t, S α ) temporarily by some atom F t until forgetting about ground atoms in Ω(S 0 ) is completed, and then put it back while preserving logical equivalence. 2
The next lemma shows that forgetting about ground atoms Ω(S 0 ) in an L formula results in an L formula. Since by Theorem 4 forgetting is computed using the syntactic substituiton denoted φ [θ ], it is sufficient to argue that L formulas are invariant with respect to this syntactic transformation.
Lemma 3. Let φ be a F x (or F y ) formula and θ a truth assignment to some of the atoms P( t j ) occurring in this formula (if any), then φ [θ ] remains a F x (F y ) formula.
Proof : Recall that notation φ [θ ], introduced in [18] , means the result of replacing every occurrence of an atom P( x) in φ by
, and recall explanations preceeding the formula (3). We prove this lemma for F x and leave out the F y case because it is symmetrical. The proof is by induction on structure of the formula φ . Let φ be a F x formula. The base case is the atomic formulas:
• , ⊥, and x =t are all unaffected by [θ ] because they contain no P, so φ [θ ] ≡ φ .
• P( t), where t is a vector of constants and/or z-variables. If P( t) ∈ θ , then φ [θ ] ≡ θ [P( t)] which is either or ⊥. Otherwise P( t) / ∈ θ and φ [θ ] ≡ φ .
• P(x), where x is a single variable (not a vector). Then φ [θ ] ≡ β .
• R(x,t), where t is either a z-variable or a constant. This can be rewritten as ∃y.R(x, y) ∧ y = t, which is a non-atomic formula to be considered below.
It is clear that in all cases, the resulting formula is in F x . The induction step. Assume F(x), A, B are F x formulas such that
formulas, and F(y) is a F y formula such that F(y)[θ ] is also F y formula. Also, let R(x, y) be a binary predicate. The formula φ can have one of the following non-atomic forms:
• A ∧ B, A ∨ B, and ¬A.
tively.
• ∀yR(x, y) ⊃ F(y). Two cases, first when P is R, second when P is F. The latter is obvious. The former case is a long (but straightforward) sequence of FOL equivalent transformations, so we won't mention it here, but the result is that φ [θ ] is a F x formula
• ∃yR(x, y) ∧ F(y). Similar to the above, we have two cases, the first when P is R and the second when P is F. The latter is easy and the former is laborious, but straightforward, and due to lack of space is omitted. But φ [θ ] is a F x formula in both cases.
Thus, in all cases the resulting formula is a F x formula. 2
Now, using the notation in (7), we show that progression remains to be a z-free L sentence. Theorem 6. Let D be a local-effect BAT based on L and α a ground action. Let Ω(s) be the characteristic set of α. Then the following formula is a progression of D S 0 w.r.t. α and this formula is an L sentence:
Proof : This is a consequence of Lemmas (2), (3) and Theorem 3.6 from [18] . Note that the final formula is uniform in S α . This theorem is important for our work because it shows for P that if an initial theory D S 0 is expressible as an ALCO(U)-like concept, then progression D S α is also expressible as an ALCO(U)-like concept.
6 Efficient Progression in p + KB Theorem 6 shows progression D S α can be translated to ALCO(U), but in a general case, the size of progression can be much larger than the size of D S 0 . If one wants to solve the projection problem by computing progression for a sequence of action, then one has to find special cases of an initial theory D S 0 such that the size of progression remains linear w.r.t. the size of D S 0 . [18] prove that progression is computationally tractable if an initial D S 0 is in proper + form, where proper + theories generalize databases by allowing incomplete disjunctive knowledge about some of the named elements of the domain [13] . A proper + knowledge base (KB) is more general than a proper KB, which is equivalent to a possibly infinite consistent set of ground literals. We show that in P, if D S 0 is a set of proper + formulas that can be translated into ALCO(U), then progression of D S 0 in our new normal form can be computed efficiently, and the normal form can be maintained without introducing any new variables. To achieve this, we show that a KB in our new normal form remains in the same normal form after forgetting about old values of fluents. The fact that forgetting in our normal form KB can be accomplished without introducing new variables is novelty that does not follow from [18] . Let e be an ewff, a well-formed formula whose only predicate is equality, and let a clause d be a disjunction of literals. Recall that the universal closure ∀(e ⊃ d) is called a guarded clause, or a proper + -formula, and a KB is called proper + if it is a finite non-empty set of guarded clauses supplemented with the axioms of equality and the set of UNA for constants. We are going to use a p + normal form in which forgetting can be accomplished without introducing new variables. The new form is logically equivalent to the proper + normal form, but it is more handy for our purposes. In addition, there is no increase in the size when a proper + formula is transformed into p + form. Definition 8. We say that a disjunction of guarded clauses i ∀(e i ⊃ d i ) is a p + formula. A p + KB is a finite set of p + formulas (plus axioms of equality and UNA for constants).
We would like to show that a KB in our p + normal form can be equivalently transformed into the same normal form after forgetting about old values of fluents, and none of the intermediate logical transformations require introducing new variables to preserve logical equivalence. Working with p + KB requires logically equivalent transformations using ∀-quantifiers applied to disjunctions. To ensure these transformations do not need fresh variables to preserve equivalence, we introduce auxiliary technical notions. Definition 9. Let S i be a set of variables that occur in a guarded clause ∀(e i ⊃ d i ). Let S = {S 1 , S 2 , ...S n } be a collection of these sets such that they are pairwise disjoint. We call a p + formula φ = i ∀(e i ⊃ d i ) separable w.r.t. S iff for each guarded clause ∀(e i ⊃ d i ) the free variables of e i ⊃ d i are a subset of one and only one set in S .
Definition 10. Let capacity(S ) be the maximum number of variables in a set from S .
Our goal is to transform a KB into a form such that forgetting about a ground atom P( c) becomes a simple syntactic operation. Note that the easiest case for forgetting about a ground atom P( c) in a formula φ irr is when P( c) is irrelevant to φ irr , or formally, when f orget(φ irr , P( c)) ≡ φ irr . For example, this applies when a formula φ irr has no occurrences of P. Otherwise, let's consider a ground (for the sake of simplicity) KB where all clauses mention a predicate symbol P at most once. Then, using distributivity ((a ∨ P( c)) ∧ (b ∨ P( c))) ≡ (a ∧ b ∨ P( c)), we can collect all sub-formulas from clauses that mention P( c) into a single conjunction φ pos . Similarly, we can collect all sub-formulas from clauses that mention ¬P( c) into a single conjunction φ neg . Then, we can use the following simple observation to forget about P( c) easily. Let P( c) be a ground atom, φ pos , φ neg , and φ irr be sentences to which P( c) is irrelevant, and KB be (P( c) ∨ φ pos ) ∧ (¬P( c) ∨ φ neg ) ∧ φ irr , Then, f orget(KB, P( c)) = (φ pos ∨ φ neg ) ∧ φ irr . Now, we would like to elaborate these observations in the context of p + KBs that have ∀-quantifiers. This preliminary discussion motivates the subsequent developments. Proposition 4. Let φ = i ∀(e i ⊃ d i ) be a p + formula. If for each d i and for every P( t) in d i the formula (e i ∧ t = c) is unsatisfiable, then P( c) is irrelevant to φ .
We are ready to define a new normal form NF + that accommodates disjunctions of guarded clauses. Our definition takes into account separability of variables that is important for equivalent transformations with ∀ such as ∀y(A(x)∨B(y)) ≡ A(x) ∨ ∀yB(y). Definition 11. Let K be a p + KB, S be a collection of pairwise disjoint sets of variables and P( c) be a ground atom. Then, K is in NF + normal form w.r.t P( c), called NF + (K , P( c)), if K = {φ | φ = i ∀(e i ⊃ d i )} such that 1. each formula φ ∈ K is separable w.r.t. S , 2. in each φ ∈ K , for any P( t) appearing in any d i , either t is c or (e i ∧ t = c) is unsatisfiable.
The crucial fact is that a p + KB can be normalized without introducing new variables. Theorem 7. Let S be a collection of sets of variables such that these sets are pairwise disjoint, and capacity(S ) = m for some integer m > 0. Let K be a KB of p + formulas that are separable w.r.t. S , and let P( c) be a ground atom. Then, K can be transformed into a KB in NF + normal form w.r.t P( c), such that each constituent formula φ = i ∀(e i ⊃d i ) is separable w.r.t. a collection S of pairwise disjoint sets of variables, S ⊆ S , and capacity(S ) = m. Theorem 8. Let S be a collection of sets of variables such that the sets in each collection are pairwise disjoint, and capacity(S ) = m for some integer m > 0. Let K be a p + KB of formulas that are separable w.r.t. S , and P( c) be a ground atom. Then, the result of forgetting P( c) in K is a p + KB of formulas that are separable w.r.t. a collection of pairwise disjoint sets of variables S such that S ⊆ S ' and capacity(S ) = m.
Proof : First convert K into NF + (K , P( c)), a NF + normal form w.r.t. P( c), and then consider the conjunction of formulas in this NF + form of K . Since each p + formula has one of the three types, group together p + formulas of same type w.r.t P( c), and using the distributivity law ((a ∨ p) ∧ (b ∨ p)) ≡ (a ∧ b ∨ p) rewrite the conjunction as:
where i and j are the number of pos-and neg-type formulas, respectively; they are linear in the number of formulas containing P(x) and ¬P(x) in K , respectively. Using Proposition 1, forgetting P( c) in this formula yields 
which is the final result of forgetting P( c) in K and is a p + KB. One may expect that i · j is O(n), where n is the number of formulas in K ; also, the number of φ irr is O(n). It is obvious that each p + formula φ pos ∨ φ neg is separable w.r.t. S , because each φ pos and φ neg is separable w.r.t S (by definition of the normal form NF + ). 2 Since our proof shows that the transformations do not incur any increase in the sizes of the formulas, the complexity of forgetting is as in [18] : linear w.r.t. the size of a KB. Once forgetting has been completed, the maximum number of variables in any guarded clause does not exceed the initial capacity(S ) of a KB that is transformed back into p + form. Consequently, we can accomplish forgetting in our action theory P, if we start with an initial theory D S 0 that is both in p + normal form and that is a z-free L sentence. The intersection of these two languages should be expressive enough for applications.
Regarding the connection between ALCO(U) and p + , it is clear that the intersection of L and the language for defining p + KBs restricts the capacity of guarded clauses to 2 since ALCO(U) is a fragment of FO 2 . In P, if context formulas F x and F y are essentially quantifier free (i.e., if context conditions can be simplified to quantifier free formulas), then D SS [Ω] can be converted to CNF of literals, and then into a p + KB. Therefore, by Theorem 6, since D SS [Ω] is O(1) in size (D SS is a fixed input), the only potentially large input that matters is D S 0 . The number of affected ground fluent literals that should be forgotten is limited by the structure of the D SS , i.e., it can be considered a constant. Therefore, we would apply a constant number of forgetting operations, each operation increasing the size of D S 0 linearly. Overall, this yields progression D S α that is linear w.r.t D S 0 . Once an initial theory D S 0 has been progressed, the projection problem can be solved using any ALCO(U) satisfiability solver.
Discussion and Future Work
The situation calculus (SC) is a well known and popular logical theory for reasoning about changes caused by events and actions. There are several different formulations of SC. According to John McCarthy the history is the following: " [20] proposed mathematical logic as a tool for representing facts about the consequences of actions and using logical reasoning to plan sequences of actions that would
